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Summary
Cuba under Fidel Castro remains a hard-line communist state with a poor record
on human rights — a record that has worsened since 2003.  With the cutoff of
assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experienced severe economic
deterioration from 1989-1993.  While there has been some improvement since 1994,
as Cuba has implemented limited reforms, the economy remains in poor shape.
As in past years, the main issue for U.S. policy toward Cuba in the 109th
Congress is how to best support political and economic change in one of world’s
remaining communist nations.  Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has
consisted largely of isolating the island nation through comprehensive economic
sanctions.  Another component of U.S. policy consists of support measures for the
Cuban people, including private humanitarian donations and U.S.-sponsored radio
and television broadcasting to Cuba.  The Bush Administration has further tightened
restrictions on travel, on sending private humanitarian assistance to Cuba, and on the
payment process for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba.  While there appears to be
broad agreement on the overall objective of U.S. policy toward Cuba — to help bring
democracy and respect for human rights to the island — there are several schools of
thought on how to achieve that objective.  Some advocate maximum pressure on the
Cuban government until reforms are enacted; others argue for lifting some U.S.
sanctions that they believe are hurting the Cuban people.  Still others call for a swift
normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations.
Most attention so far in the 109th Congress has focused on Cuba’s poor human
rights situation and on Cuba sanctions. Legislative initiatives have included three
human rights resolutions: H.Con.Res. 81 and H.Res. 193, approved by the House,
and S. 140, approved by the Senate.  Numerous initiatives would ease Cuba
sanctions: H.R. 208 and H.R. 579, would lift most economic sanctions on Cuba; S.
894 and H.R. 1814, would lift restrictions on travel to Cuba;  H.R. 1339 and S. 634,
would clarify the term “payment of cash in advance” for U.S. agricultural sales; H.R.
719 and S. 328, in addition to clarifying the term “payment of cash in advance,”
would take other measures to facilitate U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba, and repeal a
provision of law preventing payments for trademark registration and renewals from
Cuban or foreign nationals used in connection with a confiscated business or assets
in Cuba. In contrast, identical bills H.R. 1689 and S. 691 would make a change to
U.S. law regarding Cuban trademarks so that it applies to all parties regardless of
nationality.  Proposed Cuba amendments to S. 600 would add the language of S. 328
easing Cuba sanctions (S.Amdt. 281);  and authorize $15 million in democracy  and
human rights projects for Cuba (S.Amdt. 319). A failed amendment (S.Amdt. 284)
to S. 600 would have prohibited funding for television broadcasting to Cuba.  A
legislative initiative to tighten sanctions, H.R. 332, would link the lifting of the
embargo to Cuba’s extradition of U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba
 For additional information, see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions
on Travel and Remittances; and CRS Issue Brief IB10061, Exempting Food and
Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Status and Implementation.
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Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress
Most Recent Developments
On May 20-21, 2005, the Assembly to Promote Civil Society held two days of
meetings in Havana with some 200 participants.  The Assembly issued a ten-point
resolution laying out an agenda for political and economic change in Cuba.  Both
H.R. 193 (Diaz-Balart, Mario), approved by the House on May 10, and S.Res. 140
(Martinez), approved by the Senate on May 17, expressed support for the Assembly’s
meetings and its organizers.
On May 17, 2005, in Miami, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
arrested Luis Posada Carriles, who allegedly was involved in the 1976 bombing of
a Cuban airliner.  ICE subsequently charged Posada with illegally entering the United
States.  He faces a hearing before an immigration judge on June 13.  On April 13,
2005, a lawyer for Posada (who had recently snuck into the United States from
Mexico) announced that Posada would be seeking asylum in the United States
because of a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Cuba.  Venezuela has
called for Posada’s extradition.  Posada, a Venezuelan citizen, had been imprisoned
there, but escaped in 1985. 
On April 27, 2005, the House approved H.Con.Res. 81 (Menendez) — by a vote
of 398 to 27, 2 present — regarding the two-year anniversary of Cuba’s human rights
crackdown.
On April 14, 2004, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights approved a
resolution (by a vote of 21 to 17, with 15 abstentions) that invited the personal
representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to report on the status
of Cuba’s human rights situation.
On April 6, 2005, the Senate tabled S.Amdt. 284 (Dorgan) to S. 600 (Lugar), the
FY2006 and FY2007 Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, by a vote of 65-35, which
would have prohibited funds from being used for television broadcasting to Cuba.
On March 16, 2005, the House Agriculture Committee held a hearing on the
issue of the Treasury Department’s recent clarification of “payment of cash in
advance” for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. 
On March 3, 2005, the House International Relations Committee’s
Subcommittees on the Western Hemisphere and on Africa, Global Human Rights,
and International Organizations held a hearing on the second anniversary of Cuba’s
human rights crackdown.
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On February 22, 2005, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) amended the Cuba embargo regulations to clarify that U.S.
agricultural sales to Cuba under “payment of cash in advance” terms now requires
payment before shipment from U.S. ports instead of the practice of making payment
upon delivery.  The regulations, which went into effect on March 24, 2005, were
published in the Federal Register on February 25, 2005.
Political Conditions
Although Cuba has undertaken some limited economic reforms in recent years,
politically the country remains a hard-line communist state.  Fidel Castro, who turned
78 on August 13, 2004, has ruled since the 1959 Cuban Revolution, which ousted the
corrupt government of Fulgencio Batista.  Castro soon laid the foundations for an
authoritarian regime by consolidating power and forcing moderates out of the
government.  In April 1961, Castro stated that the Cuban Revolution was socialist,
and in December 1961, he proclaimed himself to be a Marxist-Leninist.  From 1959
until 1976, Castro ruled by decree.  
A Constitution was enacted in 1976 setting forth the Communist Party as the
leading force in the state and in society (with power centered in a Politburo headed
by Fidel Castro).  The Constitution also outlined national, provincial, and local
governmental structures.  Executive power is vested in a Council of Ministers,
headed by Fidel Castro as President.  Legislative authority is vested in a National
Assembly of People’s Power, currently with 609 members, that meets twice annually
for brief periods.  While Assembly members were directly elected for the first time
in February 1993, only a single slate of candidates was offered.  In October 1997, the
Cuban Communist Party held its 5th Congress (the prior one was held in 1991) in
which the party reaffirmed its commitment to a single party state and reelected Fidel
and Raul Castro as the party’s first and second secretaries.  Direct elections for the
National Assembly were again held in January 1998 and January 2003, but voters
again were not offered a choice of candidates.
In response to the challenge posed by the Varela Project, a human rights
initiative that called for changes to the Constitution (see below), the Cuban
government orchestrated a national referendum in late June 2002, signed by 8.1
million people, that declared that Cuba’s socialist system could not be changed.
Subsequently the National Assembly on June 26, 2002, approved amendments to the
Constitution stating that “socialism and the revolutionary political and social system
in the Constitution ... are irrevocable; and Cuba will never again return to
capitalism.”1
Outlook
Observers are divided over the future of the Castro government.  Although most
believe that the demise of the communist government is inevitable, there is
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considerable disagreement over when or how this may occur.  Some point to Castro’s
age and predict that the regime will collapse when Castro is not at the helm.  Other
observers maintain that Fidel Castro may remain in power for years, and that Cuba
has a plan for the succession of his brother Raul who is about five years younger than
Fidel.  They point to Cuba’s strong security apparatus and the extraordinary system
of controls that prevents dissidents from gaining popular support.  Moreover,
observers maintain that Cuba’s elite has no interest in Castro’s overthrow, and that
Castro still enjoys considerable support, in part because of the social benefits of the
Cuban revolution, but also because Cubans see no alternative to Castro.  
Even if Castro is overthrown or resigns, the important question remaining is the
possibility or viability of a stable democratic Cuba after Castro.  Analysts point out
that the Castro government has successfully impeded the development of
independent civil society, with no private sector, no independent labor movement,
and no unified political opposition.  For this reason, they contend that building a
democratic Cuba will be a formidable task, one that could meet stiff resistance. 
Human Rights
Overview. Cuba has a poor record on human rights, with the government
sharply restricting freedoms of expression, association, assembly, movement, and
other basic rights. It has cracked down on dissent, arrested human rights activists and
independent journalists, and staged demonstrations against critics.  Although some
anticipated a relaxation of the government’s oppressive tactics in the aftermath of the
Pope’s January 1998 visit, government attacks against human rights activists and
other dissidents have continued since that time, with a severe crackdown on activists
in 2003.
The 2004 State Department human rights report asserted that Cuba’s human
rights record remained poor, with the government committing numerous serious
abuses, including the imprisonment of human rights activists and other political
dissidents; the abuse of detainees and prisoners; denial of freedoms of speech, press,
assembly, and association; and targeted “acts of repudiation” against those who
disagreed with the government. The report noted that “the Interior Ministry
Department of State Security investigated and actively suppressed political
opposition and dissent” and “maintained a pervasive system of surveillance through
undercover agents, informers, rapid response brigades (RRBs), and neighborhood-
based Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs).”  Security forces and
prison officials reportedly beat and abused prisoners and other detainees, and prison
conditions remained harsh and life threatening. 
In 2004, the Cuban government released, for health reasons, 14 of the “group
of 75” political dissidents imprisoned in March 2003, while 61 remain in prison. At
the same time that the government released some political prisoners, it has continued
its harassment of democracy and human rights activists, including the arrest of 22
dissidents during the year on such charges as disrespect for authority, public disorder,
disobedience, and resisting arrest.  As noted in the State Department report, human
rights groups in Cuba estimated the number of political prisoners at approximately
300, compared to the 2003 estimate of between 300-400. 
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Crackdown in 2003.  In March 2003, the Cuban government began a massive
crackdown on independent journalists and librarians, leaders of independent labor
unions and opposition parties, and other democracy activists, including those
supporting the Varela Project.  Human rights activist Elizardo Sanchez, head of the
Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, called the
crackdown “the most intense wave of repression in the history of Cuba.”2  Some 75
activists were arrested, subjected to summary trials and prosecutions, and sentenced
to prison terms ranging from 6 to 28 years.  Foreign journalists and diplomats were
excluded from the trials.  Among the activists were 27 independent journalists,
including Raul Rivero and Oscar Espinosa Chepe, sentenced to 20 years, and Omar
Rodríguez Saludes, sentenced to 27 years.  Other sentenced democracy activists
included economist Marta Beatriz Roque (who had been imprisoned from July 1997
until May 2000), who received 20 years; Hector Palacios, a leader of the Varela
Project, who received 25 years; and Luis Enrique Ferrer García of the Christian
Liberation Movement, who received 28 years.  Another prominent political prisoner,
Oscar Elías Biscet, (who had been arrested in December 2002 after three years in
prison) was also tried in April 2003 and sentenced to 25 years in prison.  
In a further deterioration of the human rights situation, the Cuban government
executed three men on April 11, 2003, who had hijacked a ferry in Havana in an
attempt to reach the United States.  The men were executed by firing squads after
summary trials that were held behind closed doors; four other ferry hijackers received
life sentences while another received 30 years in prison. 
Rationale for the 2003 Crackdown.  Analysts see a variety of potential
reasons for Cuba’s severe crackdown on democracy activists.  The Cuban
government asserts that the crackdown was justified because the defendants were
supported by the U.S. government and that U.S. diplomats in Cuba, most notably the
head of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, James Cason, often met with the
dissidents.  Some analysts believe that the crackdown was a clear message by the
Cuban government that it will not tolerate the U.S. government’s active and open
support for the opposition movement.  Other analysts emphasize that the crackdown
was an effort by Castro to strengthen the regime’s political control in light of a
faltering economy and dim economic prospects ahead.  According to this view, an
increasingly assertive opposition movement could become a national security threat
to the Castro regime in the tough economic times ahead.  Along these lines, some
analysts see the crackdown as a way for the regime to clear away any potential
opposition in order to ensure that the eventual succession of Raul Castro to power
will be smooth.  
Some observers maintain that the Cuban government’s willingness to jeopardize
the possibility of eased U.S. trade and travel restrictions as an indication that it
currently views the dissident movement as a serious security threat.  Others, however,
believe that the Cuban government judged that there would not be any movement to
ease the embargo under the Bush Administration under any circumstances, and felt
that it had little to lose in cracking down on the opposition movement.  Finally, a
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view often heard when Castro takes harsh action that jeopardizes an improvement in
relations with the United States is that Castro actually is opposed to any further
opening to the United States because it could threaten his regime’s control.
According to this view, the crackdown against the opposition blocks any potential
easing of U.S. policy.
Release of Several Prisoners in 2004.  In 2004, the Cuban government
released 14 of the 75 arrested in March 2003, and 4 other political prisoners, for
health reasons. In the first half of the year, seven prisoners were released for health
reasons, including noted economist and democracy activist Marta Beatriz Roque,
who was released in April.  From late November until early December 2004, the
Cuban government released seven prisoners: Oscar Espinosa Chepe, Margarito
Broche, and Marcelo Lopez on November 29; Raul Rivero, and Oswaldo Alfonso
Valdes on November 30; Edel José Garcia on December 2; and Jorge Olivero
Castillo on December 6.  Many observers maintain that the releases were aimed at
improving Cuba’s relations with Europe. The prisoners were only released on parole
(licencia extrapenal) so that they could be incarcerated again at any time.  Human
rights groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have expressed
concerns that the prisoners were not released unconditionally.  
Varela Project.  This human rights initiative within Cuba has received
attention since 2002.  Named for the 19th century priest, Felix Varela, who advocated
independence from Spain and the abolition of slavery, the Varela Project has
collected thousands of signatures supporting a national plebiscite for political reform
in accordance with a provision of the Cuban Constitution.  The referendum, if
granted, would call for respect for human rights, an amnesty for political prisoners,
private enterprise, and changes to the country’s electoral law that would result in free
and fair elections.  The initiative is organized by Oswaldo Paya, who heads the
Christian Liberation Movement, and it is supported by other notable Cuban human
rights activists. 
On May 10, 2002, organizers of the Varela Project submitted 11,020 signatures
to the National Assembly calling for a national referendum.  This was more than the
10,000 required under Article 88 of the Cuban Constitution.  Former President
Jimmy Carter noted the significance of the Varela Project in his May 14, 2002
address in Havana that was broadcast in Cuba.  Carter noted that “when Cubans
exercise this freedom to change laws peacefully by a direct vote, the world will see
that Cubans, and not foreigners, will decide the future of this country.”3 
In response to the Varela Project, the Cuban government orchestrated its own
referendum in late June 2002 that ultimately led to the National Assembly amending
the Constitution to declare Cuba’s socialist system irrevocable.
The Varela Project has persevered despite the 2003 human rights crackdown,
which included the arrest of 21 project activists.  On October 3, 2003, Oswaldo Paya
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delivered more than 14,000 signatures to Cuba’s National Assembly, again
requesting a referendum on democratic reforms.
Assembly to Promote Civil Society.  Led by three prominent Cuban
human rights activists — Marta Beatriz Roque, Rene Gomez Manzano, and Felix
Bone — the Assembly to Promote Civil Society held two days of meetings in Havana
on May 20-21, 2005, with some 200 participants.  The date was significant because
May 20 is Cuba’s independence day.  Many observers had expected the government
to prevent or disrupt the proceedings. The Cuban government did prevent some
Cubans and foreigners from attending the conference, but overall the meeting was
dubbed by its organizers as the largest gathering of Cuban dissidents since the 1959
Cuban revolution.4   The Assembly issued a ten-point resolution laying out an agenda
for political and economic change in Cuba.5  Among its provisions, the resolution
called for the release of all political prisoners, demanded respect for human rights,
demanded the abolition of the death penalty, and endorsed a 1997 dissident document
entitled the “Homeland Belongs to Us All” on political and economic rights.6
United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR).  Since 1991,
the UNCHR has adopted resolutions every year, with the exception of 1998,
expressing concern about Cuba’s poor human rights situation and calling for Cuba
to cooperate with the Commission regarding its investigation of the human rights
situation. In April 2004, the UNCHR resolution — approved by a vote of 22-21, with
10 abstentions — had stronger language rebuking Cuba than in 2003.  It noted that
the Commission “deplores the events which occurred last year in Cuba involving
verdicts against certain political dissidents and journalists.” Sponsored by Honduras,
the resolution again urged Cuba to cooperate with the personal representative of the
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights.   In addition to the United States, the
countries voting in favor of the resolution included most European nations on the
Commission as well as several Asian and Latin America nations.  
For the 2005 session, the UNCHR approved a resolution on April 14, 2005, on
Cuba’s human rights situation by a vote of 21 to17, with 15 abstentions, that was
supported by European nations and several Latin American nations.   The resolution,
which was much weaker than that approved in 2004, simply invited the personal
representative of the High Commissioner for Refugees to report on the current status
of Cuba’s human rights situation.
Legislative Initiatives.  In the 109th Congress, H.Con.Res. 81 (Menendez),
passed by the House on April 27, 2005, expresses the sense of Congress regarding
the two-year anniversary of the human rights crackdown in Cuba.  The resolution
demanded that Cuba release all political prisoners; legalize all political parties, labor
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unions, and press; and hold free and fair elections.  It further calls for all UN
members to vote against Cuba’s membership on the UNCHR.  On March 3, 2005,
two subcommittees of the House International Relations Committee (Western
Hemisphere and Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations) held
a hearing on the second anniversary of Cuba’s human rights crackdown, featuring
testimony by the State Department, human rights organizations, and political
dissidents in Cuba. 
In addition, two resolutions — H.Res. 193 (Diaz-Balart, Mario), approved by
the House on May 10, 2005, and S.Res. 140 (Martinez), approved by the Senate on
May 17 — express support of the organizers and participants of the May 20, 2005,
meeting in Havana of the Assembly to Promote Civil Society.  The resolutions also
urge the international community to support the Assembly and its mission to bring
democracy to Cuba.
In addition to resolutions on, and oversight of, Cuba’s human rights situation,
Congress funds democracy and human rights projects for Cuba in annual Foreign
Operations and Commerce, Justice, and State appropriations measures.  For more
details, see U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights, below.
Economic Conditions7
With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experienced
severe economic deterioration from 1989-1993, although there has been
improvement since 1994.  Estimates of economic decline in the 1989-93 period range
from 35-50%.  From 1994-2000, however, economic growth averaged 3.7%
annually, with a high of 7.8% in 1996.
Growth rates have slowed somewhat since 2001, averaging about 2.8%
annually, with a high of 3.9% growth in 2004.8  Growth in 2001 and 2002 slowed in
the aftermath of the effects of Hurricane Michelle and the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks in the United States.  The terrorist attacks severely affected Cuba’s
tourist industry, with reports of some hotels closing and restaurants being empty.
Hurricane Michelle damaged some 45,000 homes and severely hurt the agricultural
sector.   Economic growth in 2004 was affected by a drought in eastern Cuba, the
worst in 40 years, that severely damaged agricultural crops, as well as by Hurricanes
Charley and Ivan that caused significant damage and flooding in western Cuba.  In
2005, while Cuba’s sugar harvest will suffer from another drought in the eastern part
of the country, the economic growth estimate for the year is 4.1% because of high
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nickel prices and promises of substantial Chinese investment that could further boost
Cuba’s nickel production.9
Cuba has expressed pride for the nation’s accomplishments in health and
education.  The World Bank estimates that in 2002, the adult literacy rate was 97%,
life expectancy was 77 years, and the under-5 years of age mortality rate was 9 per
1,000, the lowest rate in Latin America and comparable to the rate of the United
States.  Nevertheless, the country’s economic decline has reduced living standards
considerably and resulted in shortages in medicines and medical supplies.
When Cuba’s economic slide began in 1989, the government showed little
willingness to adopt any significant market-oriented economic reforms, but in 1993,
faced with unprecedented economic decline, Cuba began to change policy direction.
Beginning in 1993, Cubans were allowed to own and use U.S. dollars and to shop at
dollar-only shops previously limited to tourists and diplomats.  Self-employment was
authorized in more than 100 occupations in 1993, most in the service sector, and by
1996 that figure had grown to more than 150 occupations.  Other Cuban economic
reforms included breaking up large state farms into smaller, more autonomous,
agricultural cooperatives (Basic Units of Cooperative Production, UBPCs) in 1993;
opening agricultural markets in September 1994 where farmers could sell part of
their produce on the open market; opening artisan markets in October 1994 for the
sale of handicrafts; allowing private food catering, including home restaurants
(paladares) in June 1995 (in effect legalizing activities that were already taking
place); approving a new foreign investment law in September 1995 that allows fully
owned investments by foreigners in all sectors of the economy with the exception of
defense, health, and education; and authorizing the establishment of free trade zones
with tariff reductions typical of such zones in June 1996.  In May 1997, the
government enacted legislation to reform the banking system and established a new
Central Bank (BCC) to operate as an autonomous and independent entity.
Despite these measures, the quality of life for many Cubans remains difficult —
characterized by low wages, high prices for many basic goods, shortages of
medicines, and power outages — and some analysts fear that the government has
begun to backtrack on its reform efforts.  Regulations and new taxes have made it
extremely difficult for many of the nation’s self-employed.  Some home restaurants
have been forced to close because of the regulations.  Some foreign investors in Cuba
have also begun to complain that the government has backed out of deals or forced
them out of business.  In April 2004, the Cuban government limited the use of dollars
by state companies for any services or products not considered part of their core
business.  Some analysts viewed the measure as an effort to turn back the clock on
economic reform measures.10  
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On October 25, 2004, Fidel Castro announced that U.S. dollars no longer would
be used in entities that currently accept dollars (such as stores, restaurants, and
hotels).  Instead, Cubans would need to exchange their dollars for “convertible
pesos,” with a 10% surcharge for the exchange.  Cubans could exchange their dollars
or deposit them in banks with the surcharge until November 14.  Dollar bank
accounts will still be allowed, but Cubans will not be able to deposit new dollars into
the accounts.  Beginning on April 9, 2005, convertible pesos are no longer on par
with the U.S. dollar, but instead are linked to a basket of foreign currencies.  This
will reduce the value of dollar remittances sent to Cuba and will provide more hard
currency to the Cuban government.11
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro
began to build a repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward
close relations with the Soviet Union.  The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-
Cuban relationship is illustrated by such events and actions as: U.S. covert operations
to overthrow the Castro government culminating in the ill-fated April 1961 Bay of
Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis in which the United States confronted
the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba; Cuban
support for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments
in Africa and the Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans
to the United States in the so-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than
30,000 Cubans who were interdicted and housed at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo and
Panama; and the February 1996 shootdown by Cuban fighter jets of two U.S. civilian
planes operated by the Cuban American group, Brothers to the Rescue, which
resulted in the death of four U.S. crew members.
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating
the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions.  These sanctions were
made stronger with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 (P.L.102-484, Title
XVII) and with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L.
104-114), often referred to as the Helms/Burton legislation.  The CDA prohibits U.S.
subsidiaries from engaging in trade with Cuba and prohibits entry into the United
States for any vessel to load or unload freight if it has engaged in trade with Cuba
within the last 180 days.  The Helms/Burton legislation, enacted in the aftermath of
Cuba’s shooting down of two U.S. civilian planes in February 1996, combines a
variety of measures to increase pressure on Cuba and provides for a plan to assist
Cuba once it begins the transition to democracy.  Among the law’s sanctions is a
provision in Title III that holds any person or government that traffics in U.S.
property confiscated by the Cuban government liable for monetary damages in U.S.
federal court.  Acting under provisions of the law, however, both President Clinton
and President Bush have suspended the implementation of Title III at six-month
intervals. 
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Another component of U.S. policy, a so-called second track, consists of support
measures for the Cuban people.  This includes U.S. private humanitarian donations,
medical exports to Cuba under the terms of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, U.S.
government support for democracy-building efforts, and U.S.-sponsored radio and
television broadcasting to Cuba.  In addition, the 106th Congress approved the Trade
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that
allows for agricultural exports to Cuba, albeit with restrictions on financing such
exports.
The Clinton Administration made several changes to U.S. policy in the
aftermath of the Pope’s January 1998 visit to Cuba, which were intended to bolster
U.S. support for the Cuban people.  These included the resumption of direct flights
to Cuba (which had been curtailed after the February 1996 shootdown of two U.S.
civilian planes), the resumption of cash remittances for the support of close relatives
in Cuba (which had been curtailed in August 1994 in response to the migration crisis
with Cuba), and the streamlining of procedures for the commercial sale of medicines
and medical supplies and equipment to Cuba.  In January 1999, President Clinton
announced several additional measures to support the Cuban people.  These included
a broadening of cash remittances to Cuba, so that all U.S. residents (not just those
with close relatives in Cuba) could send remittances to Cuba; an expansion of direct
passenger charter flights to Cuba from additional U.S. cities other than Miami (direct
flights later in the year began from Los Angeles and New York); and an expansion
of people-to-people contact by loosening restrictions on travel to Cuba for certain
categories of travelers, such as professional researchers and those involved in a wide
range of educational, religious, and sports activities.
Bush Administration Policy
Overview.  The Bush Administration essentially has continued the two-track
U.S. policy of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions while supporting the
Cuban people through a variety of measures.  However, within this policy
framework, the Administration has emphasized stronger enforcement of economic
sanctions and has moved to further tighten restrictions on travel, remittances, and
humanitarian gift parcels to Cuba.  There was considerable reaction to the
Administration’s June 2004 tightening of restrictions for family visits and other
categories of travel.  More recently, U.S. agricultural exporters and some Members
of Congress have opposed the Administration’s February 2005 action by the Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to apply a more narrow
meaning to the term “payment of cash in advance” to require that payment for U.S.
agricultural exports is received prior to their shipment.  They fear that millions of
dollars in U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba could be jeopardized. 
Administration Actions: 2001-2003.  President Bush made his first major
statement on his Administration’s policy toward Cuba on May 18, 2001.  He affirmed
that his Administration would “oppose any attempt to weaken sanctions against
Cuba’s government ... until this regime frees its political prisoners, holds democratic,
free elections, and allows for free speech.”  He added that he would “actively support
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those working to bring about democratic change in Cuba.”12  In July 2001, President
Bush asked the Treasury Department to enhance and expand the enforcement
capabilities of the Office of Foreign Assets Control.  The President noted the
importance of upholding and enforcing the law in order to prevent “unlicenced and
excessive travel,” enforce limits on remittances, and ensure that humanitarian and
cultural exchanges actually reach pro-democracy activists in Cuba. 
On May 20, 2002, President Bush announced a new initiative on Cuba that
included four measures designed to reach out to the Cuban people: 1) facilitating
humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people by U.S. religious and other non-
governmental organizations (NGOs); 2) providing direct assistance to the Cuban
people through NGOs; 3) calling for the resumption of direct mail service to and
from Cuba;13 and 4) establishing scholarships in the United States for Cuban students
and professionals involved in building civil institutions and for family members of
political prisoners.  While the President said that he would work with Congress to
ease sanctions if Cuba made efforts to conduct free and fair legislative elections and
adopt meaningful market-based reforms, he also maintained that full normalization
of relations would only occur when Cuba had a fully democratic government, the rule
of law was respected, and human rights were fully protected.  The President’s
initiative did not include an explicit tightening of restrictions on travel to Cuba that
some observers had expected.  The President did state, however, that the United
States would “continue to enforce economic sanctions on Cuba, and the ban on travel
to Cuba, until Cuba’s government proves that it is committed to real reform.”14
On October 10, 2003, the President announced three initiatives “to hasten the
arrival of a new, free, democratic Cuba.”  First, the President instructed the
Department of Homeland Security to increase inspections of travelers and shipments
to and from Cuba in order to more strictly enforce the trade and travel embargo.
Second, the President announced that the United States would increase the number
of new Cuban immigrants each year, improve the method of identifying refugees,
redouble efforts to process Cubans seeking to leave Cuba, initiate a public
information campaign to better inform Cubans of the routes to safe and legal
migration to the United States.  Third, the President announced the establishment of
a “Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba,” that would help plan for Cuba’s
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transition from communism to democracy and help identify ways to help bring it
about. 
Tightened Sanctions in 2004 and 2005.  The Bush Administration took
several measures in 2004 to tighten U.S. sanctions against Cuba.  In February,
President Bush ordered the Department of Homeland Security to expand its policing
of the waters between Florida and Cuba with the objective of stopping pleasure
boating traffic.15  In March, the State Department announced that it would deny visas
to those Cubans who participated in the “show trials” of dissidents in March 2003,
an action that will reportedly cover some 300 Cubans.16 
On May 6, 2004, President Bush endorsed the recommendations of a report
issued by the inter-agency Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, chaired by
Secretary of State Colin Powell.  The Commission made recommendations for
immediate measures to “hasten the end of Cuba’s dictatorship” as well as longer-term
recommendations to help plan for Cuba’s transition from communism to democracy
in various areas.  The President directed that up to $59 million be committed to
implement key recommendations of the Commission, including support for
democracy-building activities and for airborne broadcasts of Radio and TV Marti to
Cuba. The report’s most significant recommendations included a number of measures
to tighten economic sanctions on family visits and other categories of travel and on
private humanitarian assistance in the form of remittances and gift parcels.
Subsequent regulations issued by the Treasury and Commerce Departments in June
2004 implemented these new sanctions. (The full Commission report is on the State
Department website at [http://www.state. gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/commission/2004/].) 
In 2005, the Administration continued to tighten U.S. economic sanctions
against Cuba by further restricting the process of how U.S. agricultural exporters may
be paid for their sales.  On February 22, 2005, the Treasury Department’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control amended the Cuba embargo regulations to clarify that the
term of “payment of cash in advance” for U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba means that
the payment is to be received prior to the shipment of the goods.  This differs from
the practice of being paid before the actual delivery of the goods, a practice that had
been utilized by most U.S. agricultural exporters to Cuba since such sales were
legalized in late 2001.
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Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations
Debate on the Overall Direction of U.S. Policy
Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objective
of U.S. policy toward Cuba — to help bring democracy and respect for human rights
to the island — there have been several schools of thought about how to achieve that
objective.  Some advocate a policy of keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban
government until reforms are enacted, while continuing current U.S. efforts to
support the Cuban people.  Others argue for an approach, sometimes referred to as
constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are
hurting the Cuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue.  Still others
call for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo.
In general, those advocating a loosening of the sanctions-based policy toward
Cuba make several policy arguments.  They assert that if the United States moderated
its policy toward Cuba — through increased travel, trade, and diplomatic dialogue
—  that the seeds of reform would be planted in Cuba, which would stimulate and
strengthen forces for peaceful change on the island.  They stress the importance to
the United States of avoiding violent change in Cuba, with the prospect of a mass
exodus to the United States and the potential of involving the United States in a civil
war scenario.  They argue that since Castro’s demise does not appear imminent, the
United States should espouse a more realistic approach in trying to induce change in
Cuba.  Supporters of changing policy also point to broad international support for
lifting the U.S. embargo, to the missed opportunities to U.S. businesses because of
the embargo, and to the increased suffering of the Cuban people because of the
embargo.  Proponents of change also argue that the United States should be
consistent in its policies with the world’s few remaining communist governments,
including China, and also maintain that moderating policy will help advance human
rights.
On the other side, opponents of changing U.S. policy maintain that the current
two-track policy of isolating Cuba, but reaching out to the Cuban people through
measures of support, is the best means for realizing political change in Cuba.  They
point out that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 sets forth a
road map of the steps Cuba that needs to take in order for the United States to
normalize relations, including lifting the embargo.  They argue that softening U.S.
policy at this time without concrete Cuban reforms would boost the Castro regime
politically and economically, and facilitate the survival of the communist regime.
Opponents of softening U.S. policy argue that the United States should stay the
course in its commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba; that sustained
sanctions can work; and that the sanctions against Cuba have only come to full
impact with the loss of large subsidies from the former Soviet bloc.  Opponents of
loosening U.S. sanctions further argue that Cuba’s failed economic policies, not the
U.S. embargo, are the causes of the economy’s rapid decline. 
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Helms/Burton Legislation
Major Provisions and Implementation.  The Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act (P.L. 104-114) was enacted into law on March 12, 1996.
Title I, Section 102(h), codifies all existing Cuban embargo executive orders and
regulations.  No presidential waiver is provided for any of these codified embargo
provisions.  This provision is significant because of the long-lasting effect on U.S.
policy options toward Cuba.  In effect, the executive branch is circumscribed in any
lifting of the embargo until certain democratic conditions are met. 
Title III, controversial because of the ramifications for U.S. relations with
countries investing in Cuba, allows U.S. nationals to sue for money damages in U.S.
federal court those persons who traffic in property confiscated in Cuba.  It extends
the right to sue to Cuban Americans who became U.S. citizens after their properties
were confiscated.  The President has authority to delay implementation for six
months at a time if he determines that such a delay would be in the national interest
and would expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba. 
Beginning in July 1996, President Clinton used this provision to delay for six
months the right of individuals to file suit against those persons benefitting from
confiscated U.S. property in Cuba.  At the time of the first suspension on July 16,
1996, the President announced that he would allow Title III to go into effect, and as
a result liability for trafficking under the title became effective on November 1, 1996.
According to the Clinton Administration, this put foreign companies in Cuba on
notice that they face prospects of future lawsuits and significant liability in the United
States.  At the second suspension on January 3, 1997, President Clinton stated that
he would continue to suspend the right to file law suits “as long as America’s friends
and allies continued their stepped-up efforts to promote a transition to democracy in
Cuba.”  He continued, thereafter, at six-month intervals, to suspend the rights to file
Title III lawsuits. 
President Bush has continued to suspend implementation of Title III at six-
month intervals, most recently on January 13, 2005, by determining that it “is
necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition
to democracy in Cuba.”  When President Bush first used his authority to suspend
Title III implementation in July 2001, he cited efforts by European countries and
other U.S. allies to push for democratic change in Cuba.  In  testimony before the
House Government Reform Committee’s Subcommittee on Human Rights and
Wellness on October 16, 2003, Assistant Secretary of State Roger Noriega justified
the continued suspension of Title III implementation by noting numerous examples
of countries condemning Cuba for its human rights crackdown in 2003. 
Title IV of the law denies admission to the United States to aliens involved in
the confiscation of U.S. property in Cuba or in the trafficking of confiscated U.S.
property in Cuba.  This includes corporate officers, principals, or shareholders with
a controlling interest in an entity involved in the confiscation of U.S. property or
trafficking of U.S. property.  It also includes the spouse, minor child, or agent of
aliens who would be excludable under the provision.  This provision is mandatory,
and only waiveable on a case-by-case basis for travel to the United States for
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humanitarian medical reasons or for individuals to defend themselves in legal actions
regarding confiscated property. 
To date the State Department has banned from the United States a number of
executives and their families from three companies because of their investment in
confiscated U.S. property in Cuba: Grupos Domos, a Mexican telecommunications
company; Sherritt International, a Canadian mining company; and BM Group, an
Israeli-owned citrus company.  In 1997, Grupos Domos disinvested from U.S.-
claimed property in Cuba, and as a result its executives are again eligible to enter the
United States.  Action against executives of STET, an Italian telecommunications
company was averted by a July 1997 agreement in which the company agreed to pay
the U.S.-based ITT Corporation $25 million for the use of ITT-claimed property in
Cuba for ten years.  For several years, the State Department has been investigating
a Spanish hotel company, Sol Melia, for allegedly investing in property that was
confiscated from U.S. citizens in Cuba’s Holguin province in 1961.  Press reports in
March 2002, indicated that a settlement was likely between Sol Melia and the
original owners of the property, but by the end of the year settlement efforts had
failed.17  In mid-June 2004, Jamaica’s SuperClubs resort chain decided to disinvest
from two Cuban hotels.  The State Department had written to the hotel chain in May
advising that its top officials could be denied U.S. entry because the company’s
Cuban investments involved confiscated U.S. property.
Foreign Reaction and the EU’s WTO Challenge.  Many U.S. allies —
including Canada, Japan, Mexico, and European Union (EU) nations — strongly
criticized the enactment of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act.  They
maintain that the law’s provisions allowing foreign persons to be sued in U.S. court
constitute an extraterritorial application of U.S. law that is contrary to international
principles.  U.S. officials maintain that the United States, which reserves the right to
protect its security interests, is well within its rights under NAFTA and the World
Trade Organization (WTO). 
Until mid-April 1997, the EU had been pursuing a case at the WTO, in which
it was challenging the Helms/Burton legislation as an extraterritorial application of
U.S. law.  The beginning of a settlement on the issue occurred on April 11, 1997,
when an EU-U.S. understanding was reached.  In the understanding, both sides
agreed to continue efforts to promote democracy in Cuba and to work together to
develop an agreement on agreed disciplines and principles for the strengthening of
investment protection relating to the confiscation of property by Cuba and other
governments.  As part of the understanding, the EU agreed that it would suspend its
WTO dispute settlement case.  Subsequently in mid-April 1998, the EU agreed to let
its WTO challenge expire. 
Talks between the United States and the European Union on investment
disciplines proved difficult, with the European Union wanting to cover only future
investments and the United States wanting to cover past expropriations, especially
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in Cuba.  Nevertheless, after months of negotiations, the European Union and the
United States reached a second understanding on May 18, 1998.  The understanding
set forth EU disciplines regarding investment in expropriated properties worldwide,
in exchange for the Clinton Administration’s obtaining a waiver from Congress for
the legislation’s Title IV visa restrictions.  Under the understanding, future
investment in expropriated property would be barred.  For past illegal expropriations,
government support or assistance for transactions related to those expropriated
properties would be denied.  A Registry of Claims would also be established to warn
investors and government agencies providing investment support that a property has
a record of claims.  These investment disciplines were to be  applied at the same time
that the President’s Title IV waiver authority was exercised.
Reaction was mixed among Members of Congress to the EU-U.S. accord, but
opposition to the agreement by several senior Members has forestalled any
amendment of Title IV in Congress.  The Bush Administration initially indicated that
the Administration was looking into the possibilities of legislation to enact a
presidential waiver for the provision, but during the June 2001 U.S.-EU summit,
President Bush noted the difficulty of persuading Congress to amend the law.18  In
July 2003, some press reports indicated that the Administration was considering an
arrangement with the EU in which the EU would take a stronger policy stance toward
Cuba in exchange for the Administration securing waiver authority for Title IV and
permanent waiver authority for Title III of the Helms/Burton legislation.19
Section 211 Trademark Provision20
Another European Union challenge of U.S. law regarding Cuba in the World
Trade Organization involves a dispute between the French spirits company, Pernod
Ricard, and the Bermuda-based Bacardi Ltd.  Pernod Ricard entered into a joint
venture with the Cuban government to produce and export Havana Club rum, but
Bacardi maintains that it holds the right to the Havana Club name.  A provision in the
FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure (Section 211 of Division A, title II, P.L.
105-277, signed into law October 21, 1998) prevents the United States from
accepting payment for trademark registrations and renewals from Cuban or foreign
nationals that were used in connection with a business or assets in Cuba that were
confiscated unless the original owner of the trademark has consented.  The provision
prohibits U.S. courts from recognizing such trademarks without the consent of the
original owner.  Although Pernod Ricard cannot market Havana Club in the United
States because of the trade embargo, it wants to protect its future distribution rights
should the embargo be lifted.  
After Bacardi began selling rum in the United States under the Havana Club
label, Pernod Ricard’s joint venture unsuccessfully challenged Bacardi in U.S.
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federal court.  In February 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
New York upheld a lower court’s ruling that the joint venture had no legal right to
use the Havana Club name in the United States and also that it was barred from
recognizing any assertion of treaty rights with regard to the trade name.
After formal U.S.-EU consultations on the issue were held in 1999 without
resolution, the EU initiated WTO dispute settlement proceedings in June 2000,
maintaining that the U.S. law violates the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS).  An August 6, 2001 ruling by the WTO panel was
described as mixed, with both sides claiming a partial victory.  The panel ruled that
WTO rules on intellectual property rights did not cover trade names, but also ruled
that a portion of the law (Section 211(a)(2)) prohibiting U.S. courts from recognizing
such Cuban trademarks based on common law rights or registration is in violation of
the TRIPS because it denies access to U.S. courts by trademark holders.  
In early October 2001, the EU formally notified the WTO that it was appealing
the ruling.  The WTO appeals panel issued its ruling on January 2, 2002, and again
the ruling was described as mixed.  According to the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), the appellate panel upheld the “U.S. position that WTO
intellectual property rights rules leave WTO members free to protect trademarks by
establishing their own trademark ownership criteria” and overturned the earlier ruling
that Section 211 was in violation of TRIPs because it denied access to U.S. courts by
trademark holders.21  However, the appellate panel also found that Section 211
violated WTO provisions on national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment,
which could require the United States to amend Section 211 so that it does not violate
WTO rules.  Although there is access to courts to enforce trademark rights, Section
211 restricted access in a discriminatory manner (against Cuban nationals and foreign
successors-in-interest). 
On March 28, 2002, the United States agreed that it would come into
compliance with the WTO ruling through legislative action by Congress by January
3, 2003.22  That deadline has been extended several times, however, since no
legislative action has been taken to bring Section 211 into compliance with the WTO
ruling.  Since no action was taken by the end of the 108th Congress, the deadline
again was extended from December 31, 2004 until June 30, 2005. 
Two different approaches have been advocated to bring Section 211 into
compliance with the WTO ruling.  Some want a narrow fix in which Section 211
would be amended so that it also applies to U.S. companies instead of being limited
to foreign companies.  Advocates of this approach argue that it would affirm that the
United States “will not give effect to a claim or right to U.S. property if that claimed
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is based on a foreign compensation.”23  Others want Section 211 repealed altogether.
They argue that the law endangers over 5,000 trademarks of over 500 U.S. companies
registered in Cuba.24  They maintain that Cuba could retaliate against U.S. companies
under the Inter-American Convention for Trademark and Commercial Protection. 
In the 108th Congress, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a July 13, 2004,
hearing on the Section 211 trademark issue featuring those advocating the narrow fix
as advanced by S. 2373 (Domenici) and H.R. 4225 (Smith of Texas), as well as those
calling for the repeal of Section 211 as advanced by S. 2002 (Baucus) and H.R. 2494
(Rangel), but no action was taken on any of these measures in the 108th Congress.
To date in the 109th Congress, several legislative initiatives would repeal the
Section 211 trademark provision from law, while two identical bills would advance
the narrow fix to Section 211 in order to comply with the WTO ruling.  Two bills
that would lift the overall embargo, H.R. 208 (Serrano) and H.R. 579 (Paul), include
provisions that would repeal Section 211.  In addition, two identical bills that would
facilitate U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba, H.R. 719 (Moran of Kansas) and S. 328
(Craig), also have provisions that would repeal Section 211. A proposed amendment
(S.Amdt. 281) to S. 600 (Lugar), the FY2006 and FY2007 Foreign Affairs
Authorization Act consists of the language of S. 328, including a provision that
would repeal Section 211.  In contrast, two identical bills — S. 691 (Domenici) and
H.R. 1689 (Feeney) — would advance the narrow fix in which Section 211 would
be amended so that it also applies to U.S. companies.
Agricultural Exports
Under U.S. sanctions, commercial agricultural exports to Cuba have been
allowed for several years, but with numerous restrictions and licensing requirements.
The 106th Congress passed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement
Act of 2000 or TSRA (P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for one-year export
licenses for selling agricultural commodities to Cuba, although no U.S. government
assistance, foreign assistance, export assistance, credits, or credit guarantees are
available to finance such exports.  TSRA, furthermore, denies exporters access to
U.S. private commercial financing or credit; all transactions must be conducted in
cash in advance or with financing from third countries.  TSRA reiterates the existing
ban on importing goods from Cuba but authorizes travel to Cuba, under a specific
license, to conduct business related to the newly allowed agricultural sales.
Regulations implementing the new provisions were published in the Federal Register
on July 12, 2001.
In November 2004, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) instructed U.S. banks to stop transfers of funds to U.S. companies for sales
of agricultural and medical products to Cuba.  The temporary move was taken so that
OFAC could examine whether there were any violations of the provisions of the
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Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, which requires that
the sales be conducted in “payment of cash in advance.”   
OFAC ultimately amended the Cuba embargo regulations on February 22, 2005,
to clarify that TSRA’s term of “payment of cash in advance” means that the payment
is received by the seller or the seller’s agent prior to the shipment of the goods from
the port at which they are loaded.  The new regulations, published in the Federal
Register on February 25, went into effect on March 24, 2005, providing a 30-day
window for exporters to comply.  U.S. agricultural exporters and some Members of
Congress strongly objected that the action constitutes a new sanction that violates the
intent of TSRA and could jeopardize millions of dollars in U.S. agricultural sales to
Cuba.  OFAC Director Robert Werner maintains that the clarification “conforms to
the common understanding of the term in international trade.”25 
Since late 2001, Cuba has purchased $900 million in agricultural products from
the United States.  Overall U.S. exports to Cuba amounted to $7.1 million in 2001,
$145.6 million in 2002, $259 million in 2003, $400 million in 2004, and $95 million
in the first three months of 2005, the majority in agricultural products.  U.S. exports
to Cuba for January to March 2005 declined about 20% from the same time period
in 2004. 26  
Some groups favor further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba.
They argue that the restrictions harm the health and nutrition of the Cuban
population.  Some believe the embargo plays into Castro’s hands by allowing him to
use U.S. policy as a scapegoat for his failed economic policies and as a rationale for
political repression.  U.S. agribusiness companies that support the removal of
restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba believe that U.S. farmers are missing out
on a market of over $700 million annually so close to the United States.  Some
exporters want to change U.S. restrictions so that they can sell agriculture and farm
equipment to Cuba.27  Some agricultural exporters who support the lifting of the
prohibition on financing contend that allowing such financing would help smaller
U.S. companies expand purchases to Cuba more rapidly.28
Opponents of further easing restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba maintain
that U.S. policy does not deny such sales to Cuba, as evidenced by the large amount
of sales since 2001.  Moreover, according to the State Department, since the Cuban
Democracy Act was enacted in 1992, the United States has licensed billions of
dollars in private humanitarian donations.  Opponents further argue that easing
pressure on the Cuban government would in effect be lending support and extending
the duration of the Castro regime.  They maintain that the United States should
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remain steadfast in its opposition to any easing of pressure on Cuba that could
prolong the Castro regime and its repressive policies.  Some agricultural producers
that export to Cuba support continuation of the prohibition on financing for
agricultural exports to Cuba because it ensures that they will be paid. 
Legislative Initiatives.  In the 108th Congress, several appropriations
measures had provisions that would have eased sanctions related to the export of
agricultural commodities, but none of these provision were enacted into law. 
In the 109th Congress, attention to date has focused on overturning the Treasury
Department’s new regulations that clarify the meaning of “payments of cash in
advance” for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba under TSRA.  The House Agriculture
Committee held a hearing on the issue on March 16, 2005, featuring the OFAC
Director and representatives of U.S. companies exporting agricultural commodities
to Cuba.  
In terms of legislative initiatives, H.R. 1339 (Emerson) and S. 634 (Chambliss),
both introduced March 16, 2005, would clarify that TSRA’s “payment of cash in
advance” term means that the payment by the purchaser and the receipt of such
payment to the seller occurs prior to the transfer of title of the commodity and the
release of control of the commodity to the purchaser. A similar provision is included
in H.R. 719 (Moran of Kansas) and S. 328 (Craig), the Agricultural Export
Facilitation Act of 2005, both introduced February 9, 2005.  These two bills also
include provisions that provide for a general license for travel transactions related to
the marketing and sale of agricultural products, as opposed to the current requirement
of a specific license for such travel transactions.  The bills also express the sense of
Congress that the Secretary of State should issue visas for the temporary entry of
Cuban nationals to conduct activities related to purchasing U.S. agricultural
commodities.  A proposed amendment — S.Amdt. 281 (Baucus) — to S. 600
(Lugar), consists of the language of S. 328, the Agricultural Export Facilitation Act
of 2005.  Two additional bills, H.R. 208 (Serrano) and H.R. 579 (Paul), would lift the
overall embargo, including restrictions on agricultural trade with Cuba.
Travel and Private Humanitarian Assistance Restrictions
Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious component
of U.S. efforts to isolate the communist government of Fidel Castro for much of the
past 40 years.  Over time there have been numerous changes to the restrictions and
for five years, from 1977 until 1982, there were no restrictions on travel.  Restrictions
on travel and remittances to Cuba are part of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations
(CACR), the overall embargo regulations administered by the Treasury Department’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
Under the Bush Administration, enforcement of U.S. restrictions on Cuba travel
has increased, and restrictions on travel and on private remittances to Cuba have been
tightened.  In March 2003, the Administration eliminated travel for people-to-people
educational exchanges unrelated to academic course work.  In June 2004, the
Administration significantly restricted travel, especially family travel, and the
provision of private humanitarian assistance to Cuba in the form of remittances and
gift parcels.
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Among the June 2004 restrictions:
! Family visits are restricted to one trip every three years under a
specific license and are restricted to immediate family members.
Under previous regulations, family visits could occur once  a year
under a general license, with travel more than once a year allowed
but under a specific license.  Previously travel had been allowed to
visit relatives to within three degrees of relationship to the traveler.
! Cash remittances, estimates of which range from $400 million to
$800 million, are further restricted.  Quarterly remittances of $300
may still be sent, but it is now restricted to members of the remitter’s
immediate family and may not be remitted to certain government
officials and certain members of the Cuban Communist Party.  The
regulations were also changed to reduce the amount of remittances
that authorized travelers may carry to Cuba, from $3000 to $300.
! Gift parcels are limited to immediate family members and are denied
to certain Cuban officials and certain members of the Cuban
Communist Party.  The contents of gift parcels may no longer
include seeds, clothing, personal hygiene items, veterinary medicines
and supplies, fishing equipment and supplies, and soap-making
equipment.
! The authorized per diem allowed for a family visit is reduced from
the State Department per diem rate, currently $167 per day, to $50
per day. 
! With the exception of informational materials, licensed travelers
may not purchase or otherwise acquire merchandise and bring it
back into the United States. Previous regulations allowed visitors to
Cuba to import $100 worth of goods as accompanied baggage.
! Fully-hosted travel is no longer allowed as a permissible category of
travel.
! Travel for educational activities is further restricted, including the
elimination of educational exchanges sponsored by secondary
schools.
In April 2005, OFAC cracked down on certain religious organizations
promoting licensed travel to Cuba and warned them not to abuse their license by
taking individuals not affiliated with the religious organizations.  Press reports
indicate that OFAC also limited the number of people who can travel under the
auspices of these groups to 25 every three months.29  OFAC’s action were prompted
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by reports that groups practicing the Afro-Cuban religion Santería had been taking
large groups to Cuba as a means of skirting U.S. travel restrictions.30
There was mixed reaction to the tightening of Cuba travel and remittance
restrictions.  Supporters maintain that the increased restrictions will deny the Cuban
government dollars that help maintain its repressive control.  Opponents argue that
the tightened sanctions are anti-family and will only result in more suffering for the
Cuban people.  There have also been concerns that the new restrictions were drafted
without considering the full consequences of their implementation.  For example, the
elimination of fully-hosted travel raised concerns about the status of 70 U.S. students
receiving full scholarships at the Latin American School of Medicine in Havana.
Members of the Congressional Black Caucus, who were instrumental in the
establishment of the scholarship program for U.S. students, expressed concern that
the students may be forced to abandon their medical education because of the new
OFAC regulations.  As a result of these concerns, OFAC ultimately licensed the
medical students in August 2004 to continue their studies for a period of two years
and engage in travel-related transactions.
Major arguments made for lifting the Cuba travel ban are that it contributes to
the suffering of Cuban families; it hinders efforts to influence conditions in Cuba and
may be aiding Castro by helping restrict the flow of information; it abridges the rights
of ordinary Americans; and Americans can travel to other countries with communist
or authoritarian governments.  Major arguments in opposition to lifting the Cuba
travel ban are that more American travel would support Castro’s rule by providing
his government with millions of dollars in hard currency; that there are legal
provisions allowing travel to Cuba for humanitarian purposes that are used by
thousands of Americans each year; and that the President should be free to restrict
travel for foreign policy reasons.
Legislative Initiatives.  In the 108th Congress, several appropriations
measures had provisions that would have eased Cuba travel restrictions in several
ways, but none of these provisions was enacted into law.
To date in the 109th Congress, two bills have been introduced that would
specifically lift overall restrictions on travel to Cuba:  S. 894 (Enzi) and H.R. 1814
(Flake). In addition, two bills that would lift the overall embargo on trade and
financial transaction with Cuba, H.R. 208 (Serrano) and H.R. 579 (Paul), would
include removing restrictions on travel to Cuba.  Also, two identical bills dealing
with easing restrictions on exporting agricultural commodities to Cuba, H.R. 719
(Moran of Kansas) and S. 328 (Craig), include provisions that provide for a general
license for travel transactions related to the marketing and sale of agricultural
products, as opposed to the current requirement of a specific license for such travel
transactions.
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Drug Interdiction Cooperation  
Because of Cuba’s geographic location, the country’s waters and airspace have
been used by illicit narcotics traffickers to transport drugs for ultimate destinations
in the United States.  Over the past several years, Cuban officials have expressed
concerns over the use of their waters and airspace for drug transit as well as increased
domestic drug use. The Cuban government has taken a number of measures to deal
with the drug problem, including legislation to stiffen penalties for traffickers,
increased training for counternarcotics personnel, and  cooperation with a number of
countries on anti-drug efforts.  Cuba has bilateral counternarcotics agreements with
33 countries and less formal arrangements with 16 others, according to the
Department of State.  In 2003, Cuba began nationwide multi-agency anti-drug efforts:
Operation Hatchet III, focusing on maritime and air interdiction; and Operation
Popular Shield, focusing on investigations. 
There has been a mixed record of cooperation with Cuba on anti-drug efforts.
In 1996, Cuban authorities cooperated with the United States in the seizure of 6.6
tons of cocaine aboard the Miami-bound Limerick, a Honduran-flag ship.  Cuba
turned over the cocaine to the United States and cooperated fully in the investigation
and subsequent prosecution of two defendants in the case in the United States.
Cooperation has increased since 1999 when U.S. and Cuban officials met in Havana
to discuss ways of improving anti-drug cooperation.  Cuba accepted an upgrading of
the communications link between the Cuban Border Guard and the U.S. Coast Guard
as well as the stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) at
the U.S. Interests Section in Havana.  
The Coast Guard official was posted to the U.S. Interests Section in September
2000, and since that time, coordination has increased somewhat.  The State
Department, in its March 2005 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,
maintains that Cuban interest in engaging with the Coast Guard specialist has ebbed
and flowed.  According to the report, Cuba’s National Anti-drug Directorate and its
Border Guard have provided U.S. officials limited exposure to Cuban
counternarcotics efforts, investigative case information on narcotics trafficking, and
information on suspect vessels and aircraft.
In the past, Cuba has called for a bilateral anti-drug cooperation agreement with
the United States.31  In January 2002, Cuba deported to the United States Jesse James
Bell, a U.S. fugitive wanted on drug charges, and in early March 2002, Cuba arrested
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a convicted Colombian drug trafficker, Rafael Bustamante, who escaped from jail in
Alabama in 1992.  At the time, while Drug Enforcement Administration head Asa
Hutchison expressed appreciation for Cuba’s actions, he indicated that cooperation
would continue on a case-by-case basis, not through a bilateral agreement.32 
Legislative Initiatives.  In the 108th Congress, the House-passed version of
the FY2005 Foreign Operations measure, H.R. 4818, included a provision, in Section
572, that no International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Funds be made
available for assistance to Cuba.  In contrast, following the pattern of the past several
years, the Senate-passed version of the bill would have provided (Sec. 5091) $5
million to establish cooperation with appropriate agencies of the Cuban government
on counter-narcotics matters.  The money would not be available if the President
certified that Cuba did not have in place appropriate procedures to protect against the
loss of innocent life in the air and on the ground in connection with the interdiction
of illegal drugs and there was evidence of involvement of the Cuban government in
drug trafficking. Ultimately, neither  provision was  included in the FY2005 omnibus
appropriations measure (P.L. 108-447, H.Rept. 108-792). 
Cuba and Terrorism33
Cuba was added to the State Department’s list of states sponsoring international
terrorism in 1982 because of its alleged ties to international terrorism and its support
for terrorist groups in Latin America.  Cuba had a long history of supporting
revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa, but in 1992,
Fidel Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the
past.  Cuba’s change in policy was in large part because of the breakup of the Soviet
Union, which resulted in the loss of billions of dollars in annual subsidies to Cuba,
and led to substantial Cuban economic decline.  
Cuba remains on the State Department’s terrorism list.  According to the State
Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2004 report (issued in April 2005),
Cuba has “continued to actively oppose the U.S.-led coalition prosecuting the global
war on terrorism,” and “the Cuban government’s actions and public statements run
contrary to the spirit of the UN conventions on terrorism that it has signed.”
The State Department report also noted that Cuba continued to provide limited
support to Foreign Terrorist Organizations as well as safe haven for terrorists. The
report maintained that Cuba provides safe haven to various Basque ETA members
from Spain despite a November 2003 request from the Spanish government to deny
them sanctuary. The report also maintained that Cuba provided safe haven and some
degree of support to members of two Colombian insurgent groups, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). (The
State Department’s 2002 and 2003 Patterns of Global Terrorism reports
acknowledged, however, that Colombia acquiesced to this arrangement and that
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Colombia publicly said that it wanted Cuba’s continued mediation with the ELN in
Cuba.)  The 2004 report also noted that more than 70 fugitives from U.S. justice had
taken refuge in Cuba.  Many of these are accused of committing violent actions in the
United States, including Joanne Chesimard, who is wanted for the murder of a New
Jersey State Trooper in 1973. 
In general, those who support keeping Cuba on the terrorism list argue that there
is ample evidence that Cuba supports terrorism.  They point to the government’s
history of supporting terrorist acts and armed insurgencies in Latin America and
Africa.  They point to the government’s continued hosting of members of foreign
terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice. Critics of retaining Cuba on
the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover from the Cold War. They argue that
domestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list and maintain that
Cuba’s presence on the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles against serious
terrorist threats.
Although Cuba offered support to the United States in the aftermath of the
World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks in 2001, Fidel Castro also stated that the
attacks were in part a consequence of the United States having applied “terrorist
methods” for years.34  Cuba’s subsequent statements became increasingly hostile,
according to press reports, which quoted Cuba’s mission to the United Nations as
describing the U.S. response to the U.S. attacks as “fascist and terrorist” and that the
United States was using the attack as an excuse to establish “unrestricted tyranny
over all people on Earth.”35  Castro himself said that the U.S. government was run by
“extremists” and “hawks” whose response to the attack could result in an “infinite
killing of innocent people.”36
The Cuban government, however, had a much more muted reaction to the U.S.
decision to send captured Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters from Afghanistan to the U.S.
naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  Although the Cuban government objects to
the U.S. presence at Guantanamo as a national security threat and opposes the
presence as illegal, it has not opposed the new mission of housing detainees from
Afghanistan.37  The Cuban government has, however, expressed concerns about the
treatment of terrorist suspects at Guantanamo.  (Also see “Guantanamo Naval Base”
below.) 
Cuba and Biological Weapons?  U.S. government concerns about Cuba’s
capability to produce biological weapons date back several years. In 1998, then U.S.
Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated in a transmittal letter (accompanying a
report to Congress on  Cuba’s threat to U.S. national security) that he was “concerned
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about Cuba’s potential to develop and produce biological agents, given its
biotechnology infrastructure...”38
 Cuba began building up its biotechnology industry in the 1980s and has spent
millions investing in the sector.  The industry was initially geared “to apply
biotechnology and genetic engineering to agriculture in order to increase yields” but
has also produced numerous vaccines, interferon, and other drugs and has exported
many of its biotechnology products.39  In 1999, the British pharmaceutical company
GlaxoSmithKline announced an agreement to test and market a new Cuban
meningitis vaccine that might eventually be used in the United States.40  In May
2003, the Center for Defense Information published a report on a delegation sent to
Cuba that visited nine Cuban biotechnology facilities.41
In 2002, the State Department made controversial allegations that Cuba
biotechnology sector, has been involved in developing biological weapons.  On May
6, 2002, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John
Bolton stated that “the United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited
offensive biological warfare research-and-development effort” and “has provided
dual-use technology to other rogue states.”  Bolton called on Cuba “to cease all BW-
applicable cooperation with rogue states and to fully comply with all of its
obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.”42  Although Bolton’s
statement received considerable media attention, it was similar to a March 19, 2002
statement by Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl Ford
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.  
When questioned on the issue, Secretary of State Powell maintained that Under
Secretary Bolton’s statement was not based on new information. Powell asserted that
the United States believes Cuba has the capacity and the capability to conduct
research on biological weapons but emphasized that the Administration had not
claimed that Cuba had such weapons. Some observers viewed Powell’s statement as
contradicting that of Under Secretary Bolton.43 
In response to Under Secretary Bolton’s statement, the Cuban government
called the allegations a lie and maintained that the Bush Administration was trying
to justify its hard-line policies just when the momentum is increasing in the United
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States to ease the embargo.  During his trip to Cuba, former President Jimmy Carter
criticized the Bush Administration for the allegations and said that Administration
officials who had briefed him before the trip assured him that Cuba had not shared
anything with other countries that could be used for terrorist purposes.44 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs held a hearing on the issue on June
5, 2002.45  At the hearing, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research
Carl Ford distinguished between the term “effort” and “program,” and maintained
that Cuba has a biological weapons effort and not a biological weapons program.
Ford characterized a program as something substantial and multifaceted that includes
test facilities, production facilities, and a unit within the military specifically
designated for such weapons capability.  In contrast, he characterized an effort as the
research and development that would be necessary to create biological weapons. 
In late June 2003, news reports stated that an employee of the State
Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research maintained that Undersecretary
Bolton’s assertions about Cuba and biological weapons were not supported by
sufficient intelligence.46 
In March 30, 2004, congressional testimony before the House International
Relations Committee, Under Secretary of State John Bolton asserted that “Cuba
remains a terrorist and BW threat to the United States.”  According to Bolton: “The
Bush Administration has said repeatedly that we are concerned that Cuba is
developing a limited biological weapons effort, and called on Fidel Castro to cease
his BW aspirations and support of terrorism.”  Bolton went on to add a caveat,
however, that “existing intelligence reporting is problematic, and the Intelligence
Community’s ability to determine the scope, nature, and effectiveness of any Cuban
BW program has been hampered by reporting from sources of questionable access,
reliability, and motivation.”47  The New York Times reported on September 18, 2004
that the Bush Administration, using more stringent intelligence standards, had
“concluded that it is no longer clear that Cuba has an active, offensive bio-weapons
program.”48
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In 2005, the issue of Cuba and biological weapons has received increased
attention during the confirmation process for the nomination of State Department
official John Bolton to become U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.  Among the
concerns raised about Bolton are allegations that he sought to have two U.S. officials
fired (a State Department Intelligence and Research Bureau analyst and the national
intelligence officers for Latin America) who disagreed with him about Cuba’s
involvement in biological weapons.49
Cuba as the Victim of Terrorism. Cuba has been the target of various
terrorist incidents over the years.  In 1976, a Cuban plane was bombed, killing 73
people.  In 1997, there were almost a dozen bombings in the tourist sector in Havana
and in the Varadero beach area in which an Italian businessman was killed and
several others were injured.  Two Salvadorans were convicted and sentenced to death
for the bombings in March 1999, and three Guatemalans were sentenced to prison
terms ranging from 10-15 years in January 2002.  Cuban officials maintain that
Cuban exiles funded the bombings.  
In November 2000, four anti-Castro activists were arrested in Panama for a plot
to kill Fidel Castro.  One of the accused, Luis Posada Carriles, was allegedly
involved in the 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner.50  The four stood trial in March
2004 and were sentenced on weapons charges in the case to prison terms ranging
from seven to eight years.  In late August 2004, Panamanian President Mireya
Moscoso pardoned the four men before the end of her presidential term.  Three of the
men are U.S. citizens and traveled to Florida, where they received strong support
from some in the Cuban American community, while Posada Carriles reportedly
traveled to another country.  U.S. State Department officials did not criticize
President Moscoso’s pardon of the four, but maintained that they did not lobby
Panama for the pardons.51  
On April 13, 2005, Posada’s lawyer said that his client, reportedly in the United
States for a month after sneaking in across the Mexican border, would seek asylum
in the United States because he has a “well-founded fear of persecution” for his
opposition to Fidel Castro.52  Posada, a Venezuelan citizen, had been imprisoned in
Venezuela for the bombing of the Cuban airliner in 1976 but reportedly was allowed
to “escape” from prison in 1985 after his supporters paid a bribe to the prison
warden.53  He had been acquitted for the bombing but remained in prison pending a
prosecutorial appeal.  Posada also reportedly admitted, but later denied, involvement
CRS-29
54 Oscar Corral and Alfonso Chardy, “Victim’s Kin Oppose Posada Bid for Asylum,” Miami
Herald, May 7, 2005. 
55 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Public Affairs, Statement, May 17, 2005.
56 Background information on Guantanamo is drawn from out of print CRS Report 94-701,
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba: Background and Current Issues, by Ronald O’Rourke
and Mark P. Sullivan, Sept. 2, 1994; copies available from author, Mark Sullivan at 7-7689.
57 Jerry Seper, “U.S. Prepares for Haitian Refugees; Guantanamo Could Hold 20,000,”
Washington Times, February 24, 2004.
in a string of bombings in Havana in 1997, one of which killed an Italian tourist.54
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested Posada on May 17, 2005,
and subsequently charged with illegally entering the United States.  He faces a
hearing before an immigration judge on June 13. A Department of Homeland
Security press release indicated that ICE does not generally deport people to Cuba or
countries believed to be acting on Cuba’s behalf.55  Venezuela has requested Posada’s
extradition and pledged that it would not hand Posada over to Cuba.
Guantanamo Naval Base56
The 45-square mile U.S. naval facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has been a
U.S. base since 1903, and under a 1934 treaty that remains in force, the U.S. presence
can only be terminated by mutual agreement or by abandonment by the United States.
When Fidel Castro assumed power in the 1959 Cuban revolution, the new
government gave assurances that it would respect all its treaty commitments,
including the 1934 treaty covering the Guantanamo base.  Subsequently, however,
as U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated, the Cuban government opposed the presence
as illegal. 
The mission of the base has changed over time.  During the Cold War, the base
was viewed as a good location for controlling Caribbean sea lanes, as a deterrent to
the Soviet presence in the Caribbean, and as a location for supporting potential
military operations in the region.  In 1994-1995, the base was used to house
thousands of Cubans and Haitians fleeing their homeland, but by 1996 the last of
refugees had departed, with most Cubans paroled into the United States, pursuant to
a May 1995 U.S.-Cuban migration accord.  Since the 1995 accord, the U.S. Coast
Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to Cuba, while
a much smaller number, those deemed at risk for persecution, have been taken to
Guantanamo and then granted asylum in a third country.  In the aftermath of
increased violence in Haiti in February 2004, the base reportedly was being
considered as a contingency option to house Haitian migrants in the event of a mass
exodus from Haiti.57
Another mission for the Guantanamo base emerged with the U.S.-led global
campaign against terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks in the United States.  With the U.S. war in Afghanistan in 2001, the United
States decided to send captured Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters to be imprisoned in
Guantanamo.  Although the Cuban government has objected to the U.S. presence at
Guantanamo, it did not initially oppose the new mission of housing detainees.
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Defense Minister Raul Castro noted that, in the unlikely event that a prisoner would
escape into Cuban territory, Cuba would capture the prisoner and return him to the
base.58  The Cuban government, however, has expressed concerns about the treatment
of prisoners at the U.S. base and has said it will keep pressing the international
community to investigate the treatment of terrorist suspects.59  In January 2005, it
denounced what it described as “atrocities” committed at the Guantanamo base.60
With regard to the future of the Guantanamo base, a provision in the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114, Section 210), states
that once a democratically elected Cuban government is in place, U.S. policy will be
to be prepared to enter into negotiations either to return the base to Cuba or to
renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable terms.  
Radio and TV Marti
U.S.-government sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba — Radio
and TV Marti — began in 1985 and 1990 respectively.  As spelled out in the
Broadcasting Board of Governors FY2006 Budget Request, the objectives of Radio
and TV Marti are 1) to support the right of the Cuban people to seek, receive, and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers; 2) to be
effective in furthering the open communication of information and ideas through use
of radio and television broadcasting to Cuba; 3) to serve as a consistently reliable and
authoritative source of accurate, objective, and comprehensive news; and 4) to
provide news, commentary, and other information about events in Cuba and
elsewhere to promote the cause of freedom in Cuba. 
TV Marti broadcasts from facilities in Cudjoe Key, Florida for four and one-half
hours daily from 6:00 p.m. - 10:30 p.m.  It also broadcasts 24 hours a day, seven days
a week on the Hispasat satellite and is also available on the Internet 24 hours a day.
Radio Marti broadcasts on short and medium wave (AM) channels for 24 hours
Tuesday through Saturday, 23 hours on Sunday, and 19 hours on Monday. Surveys
of Cubans have shown a Radio Marti listenership of 9% in 2000 and 5% in 2001.61
Until October 1999, U.S.-government funded international broadcasting
programs had been a primary function of the United States Information Agency
(USIA).  When USIA was abolished and its functions were merged into the
Department of State at the beginning of FY2000, the Broadcasting Board of
Governors became an independent  agency that included such entities as the Voice
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of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia,
and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), which manages Radio and TV Marti.
OCB is headquartered in Miami, Florida.  Legislation in the 104th Congress (P.L.
104-134) required the relocation of OCB from Washington D.C. to south Florida.
The move began in 1996 and was completed in 1998.
Both Radio and TV Marti have at times been the focus of controversies,
including questions about adherence to broadcast standards.  There have been various
attempts over the years to cut funding for the programs, especially for TV Marti,
which has not had an audience because of Cuban jamming efforts. Various studies
and audits of these programs have been conducted, including investigations by the
U.S. General Accounting Office, by a 1994 congressionally established Advisory
Panel on Radio and TV Marti, and by the State Department’s Office of the Inspector
General.62 (For background on Cuba broadcasting through 1994, see CRS Report 94-
636, Radio and Television Broadcasting to Cuba: Background and Issues through
1994.) 
From FY1984 through FY2005, Congress has appropriated about $487 million
for broadcasting to Cuba, with about $298 million for Radio Marti (since FY1984)
and $189 million for TV Marti (since FY1989).  
Debate on TV Marti.  In the various congressional debates on TV Marti over
the years, opponents of continued funding of the program maintain that virtually the
only people who see TV Marti in Cuba are those Cubans who visit the consular
section of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, which has a waiting room in which
TV Marti may be viewed.  These critics argue that almost $190 million has been
spent by the United States for TV Marti, while the Cuban government only needs to
spend a few thousand dollars to jam the broadcasts effectively.  They argue that TV
Marti is a waste of taxpayers’ money because it does not contribute to the promotion
of freedom and democracy in Cuba, unlike Radio Marti, which some Cubans listen
to as a source of information.  Opponents also argue that the conversion of TV Marti
from VHF to UHF transmission has not succeeded in overcoming Cuba’s jamming
efforts.
In contrast, supporters of continued TV Marti funding point to a congressionally
mandated Advisory Panel in 1994, which stated that “the Cuban people have an
ardent desire and a genuine need to receive the programming produced by TV
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Marti.”63  Supporters argue that eliminating TV Marti would send a message to the
Cuban people that the United States is not committed to the cause of freedom in
Cuba.  They believe that eliminating TV Marti would be giving in to the dictatorial
Castro government, which suppresses the free flow of information in Cuba.  These
proponents contend that it is impossible for the Cuban government to completely jam
TV Marti, and maintain that significant numbers of Cubans have attempted to tune
in to the programming.  Still others point to the potential use of TV Marti in the event
of a crisis or upheaval in Cuba’s future, and argue that in such a scenario, it would
be important to have TV Marti available as a news source.
Airborne Broadcasts.  In early May 2004, the Commission for Assistance
for a Free Cuba called for the immediate deployment of the EC-130E/J Commando
Solo airborne platform for weekly airborne radio and television broadcasts to Cuba
in order to overcome Cuban jamming.  It also called for funds “to acquire and refit
a dedicated airborne platform for full-time transmission of Radio and TV Marti into
Cuba.”  In support of these recommendations, President Bush directed that up to $18
million be committed “for regular airborne broadcasts to Cuba and the purchase of
a dedicated airborne platform for the transmission of Radio and Television Marti into
Cuba.”  The longer term proposal for a dedicated airborne platform would not be a
military aircraft but an aircraft acquired and operated by the Broadcasting Board of
Governors’ Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB). 
At present, there are six EC-130E/J Commando Solo aircraft flown by the Air
Force Special Operations Wing at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The aircraft are
specialized assets that have been used to conduct information operations,
psychological operations, and civil affairs broadcasts worldwide including Grenada
in 1983, Operation Desert Storm in 1990-1991, Kosovo in 1999, Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.64  In May 2003, the aircraft
was used in a test to broadcast Radio and TV Marti to Cuba in an effort to overcome
Cuban jamming of the U.S.-government broadcasts.  The State Department
announced that Radio and TV Marti were broadcast via the airborne platform for
several hours on August 21, 2004.
FY2006 Funding.  The Administration is requesting $37.7 million for Cuba
broadcasting in FY2006, about a $10 million increase from the $27.6 million
appropriated for FY2005.  The increase is for the Broadcasting Board of Governors
to acquire and outfit an aircraft for dedicated airborne radio and television broadcasts
to Cuba.  According to the budget request, the aircraft would support 4 hours a day
of Radio and TV Marti broadcasts with the goal of overcoming Cuban government
jamming. 
On April 6, 2005, during Senate floor consideration of S. 600, the FY2006 and
FY2007 Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, the Senate rejected an amendment —
S.Amdt. 284 (Dorgan) by a vote of 65-35 — that would have prohibited funds from
being used for television broadcasting to Cuba. 
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FY2005 Funding.  The Administration requested $27.6 million for Cuba
broadcasting, with $17.4 million for Radio Marti and $10.3 million for TV Marti, and
this was fully funded in the FY2005 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 108-447,
H.Rept. 108-792).  In the Administration’s budget request, the Office of Cuba
Broadcasting (OCB) proposed to close down the existing aerostat transmission
system for TV Marti in Cudjoe Key, Florida, while the broadcast would continue to
be carried on the Hispasat satellite.  The OCB is reportedly continuing to explore
ways of mitigating the jamming of TV Marti. 
U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights 
Over the past several years, the United States provided assistance — primarily
through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), but also through
the State Department — to increase the flow of information on democracy, human
rights, and free enterprise to Cuba.  USAID’s Cuba program supports a variety of
U.S.-based non-governmental organizations to promote rapid, peaceful transition to
democracy, help develop civil society, and build solidarity with Cuba’s human rights
activists.65  These efforts are funded through Economic Support Funds (ESF) in the
annual foreign operations appropriations bill.  In FY2001, $4.989 million was
provided for various Cuba projects; $5 million was provided for FY2002; $6 million
was provided for FY2003; and while almost $7 million was originally appropriated
for FY2004, ultimately a total of $21.4 million was provided for the year through re-
programming to fund democracy-building activities recommended by the
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba.
For FY2005, the Administration requested $9 million to back public diplomacy
to promote democratization, respect for human rights, and the development of a free
market economy in Cuba.  The House-passed version of the FY2005 foreign
operations appropriations bill, H.R. 4818, did not specifically earmark such
assistance for Cuba, but the House Appropriations Committee’s report to the bill
(H.Rept. 108-599) noted that the committee fully supports the Administration’s
budget request.  In final action, Congress fully funded the $9 million request for Cuba
projects in the FY2005 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 108-447, H.Rept. 108-
792).  
For FY2006, the Administration is requesting $15 million in ESF assistance for
democracy activities for Cuba.  According to the request, the funds will support
USAID-administered programs with democracy and human rights groups, focusing
on those groups that disseminate information to the Cuban people and those that
provide humanitarian assistance to victims of political repression and their families.
USAID will also continue to work with third-country non-governmental
organizations in Latin America and Europe to raise awareness of Cuban government
repression.
During April 6, 2005, Senate floor consideration of S. 600, the FY2006 and
FY2007 Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, an amendment was proposed — S.Amdt.
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319 (Ensign) — that would authorize not more than $15 million in assistance and
other support “for individuals and independent nongovernmental organizations to
support democracy-building efforts for Cuba” and up to $5 million for the OAS to
support work on Cuba’s human rights situation. 
In addition to funding through foreign operations appropriations, the United
States provides democratization assistance for Cuba through the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED), which is funded through the annual Commerce,
Justice, and State (CJS) appropriations measure.  Cuba funding through NED has
steadily increased over the past several years. NED-funded democracy projects for
Cuba amounted to $765,000 in FY2001; $841,000 in FY2002; $1.143 million in
FY2003; and $1.149 million in FY2004.  So far in FY2005, NED has funded
$864,000 in Cuba projects with money received from the State Department.
Migration Issues66
1994 and 1995 Agreements.  In 1994 and 1995, Cuba and the United States
reached two migration accords designed to stem the mass exodus of Cubans
attempting to reach the United States by boat.  On the minds of U.S. policymakers
was the 1980 Mariel boatlift in which 125,000 Cubans fled to the United States with
the approval of Cuban officials.  In response to Castro’s threat to unleash another
Mariel, U.S. officials reiterated U.S. resolve not to allow another exodus.  Amidst
escalating numbers of fleeing Cubans, on August 19, 1994, President Clinton
abruptly changed U.S. migration policy, under which Cubans attempting to flee their
homeland were allowed into the United States, and announced that the U.S. Coast
Guard and Navy would take Cubans rescued at sea to the U.S. naval base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  Despite the change in policy, Cubans continued fleeing in
large numbers.  
As a result, in early September 1994, Cuba and the United States began talks
that culminated in a September 9, 1994 bilateral agreement to stem the flow of
Cubans fleeing to the United States by boat.  In the agreement, the United States and
Cuba agreed to facilitate safe, legal, and orderly Cuban migration to the United
States, consistent with a 1984 migration agreement.  The United States agreed to
ensure that total legal Cuban migration to the United States would be a minimum of
20,000 each year, not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens.  In a change of
policy, the United States agreed to discontinue the practice of granting parole to all
Cuban migrants who reach the United States, while Cuba agreed to take measures to
prevent unsafe departures from Cuba.
In May 1995, the United States reached another accord with Cuba under which
the United States would parole the more than 30,000 Cubans housed at Guantanamo
into the United States, but would intercept future Cuban migrants attempting to enter
the United States by sea and would return them to Cuba.  The two countries would
cooperate jointly in the effort. Both countries also pledged to ensure that no action
would be taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a consequence of their
CRS-35
67 For more information, see CRS Report RS20450, The Case of Elian Gonzalez: Legal
Basics, by Larry M. Eig.
attempt to immigrate illegally.  On January 31, 1996, the Department of Defense
announced that the last of some 32,000 Cubans intercepted at sea and housed at
Guantanamo had left the U.S. Naval Base, most having been paroled into the United
States.  
Elian Gonzalez Case.67  From late November 1999 through June 2000,
national attention became focused on Cuban migration policy as a result of the Elian
Gonzalez case, the five-year old boy found clinging to an inner tube off the coast of
Fort Lauderdale.  The boy’s mother drowned in the incident, while his father, who
resided in Cuba, called for his return.  Although the boy’s relatives in Miami wanted
him to stay in the United States, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ruled
that the boy’s father had the sole legal authority to speak on his son’s behalf.  After
numerous legal appeals by the Miami relatives were exhausted, the boy returned to
Cuba with his father in June 2000.  In Cuba, Fidel Castro orchestrated numerous
mass demonstrations and a media blitz on the issue until the boy’s return.  The case
generated an outpouring of emotion among the Cuban population as well as in south
Florida.
Wet Foot/Dry Foot Policy.  Since the 1995 migration accord, the U.S. Coast
Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to their country,
while those deemed at risk for persecution have been transferred to Guantanamo and
then found asylum in a third country.  Those Cubans who reach shore are allowed to
apply for permanent resident status in one year, pursuant to the Cuban Adjustment
Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-732).  This so-called “wet foot/dry foot” policy has been
criticized by some as encouraging Cubans to risk their lives in order to make it to the
United States and as encouraging alien smuggling.  Others maintain that U.S. policy
should welcome those migrants fleeing communist Cuba whether or not they are able
to make it to land.  
U.S. prosecution against migrant smugglers in Florida has increased in recent
years with numerous convictions. There have been several violent incidents in which
Cuban migrants have brandished weapons or in which Coast Guard officials have
used force to prevent Cubans from reaching shore.  In July 2003, a U.S. federal court
in Florida convicted a Cuban national for hijacking a plane to Key West on April 1,
2003.  Another six Cubans were convicted in Key West in December 2003 for
hijacking a Cubana Airlines plane to Florida earlier in the year.
The Cuban government has taken forceful action against individuals engaging
in alien smuggling.  Prison sentences of  up to three years may be imposed against
those engaging in alien smuggling, and for incidents involving death or violence, a
life sentence may be imposed.  On April 11, 2003, the Cuban government executed
three men who had hijacked a ferry in Havana on April 2 in an attempt to reach the
United States. The ferry hijacking had been preceded by the hijacking of two small
planes to the United States.  The summary execution prompted worldwide
condemnation of the Cuban government.  The Cuban government maintained that it
took the action to prevent additional hijackings.
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The U.S. Interest Section in Havana has officers that visit the homes of returned
migrants to assess the Cuban government’s treatment of those repatriated.  The
Department of State (pursuant to P.L. 105-277, Section 2245) makes a semi-annual
report to Congress on the methods employed by the Cuban government to enforce the
the 1994 migration agreement and on the Cuban government’s treatment of those
returned.  In the most recent report to Congress, submitted in May 2004, the State
Department noted that it has been unable to monitor returnees outside Havana since
March 2003.  The State Department noted, however, that prior to that time, “a
majority of the returnees it monitored did not suffer retribution from the Cuban
authorities as a result of their attempt to depart illegally” but noted that “there
continued to be clear and credible instances of harassment and punishment of
returnees.”68
On July 21, 2003, the U.S. Coast Guard repatriated 15 Cubans who had been
interdicted on a Cuban government vessel that had been stolen on July 15 (12 of the
Cubans were involved in stealing the boat and overpowered the three others who
were guarding the government vessel.)  The United States returned the Cubans after
assurances from the Cuban government that no one would face execution and no one
would serve more than 10 years in prison.  The Cuban government lauded the return
of the migrants for being in line with the 1995 migration agreement.  The repatriation
of the migrants prompted widespread criticism of the Administration in Florida and
among some Members of Congress.  Some critics called for an investigation into the
U.S.-Cuban negotiations that led to the return of the migrants and some have called
for the Administration to change the policy of repatriating those Cubans interdicted
at sea.  Supporters of the policy maintained that implementation of the migration
accords is important for preventing another mass exodus of Cubans fleeing to the
United States.
On October 10, 2003, President Bush announced that the United States would
increase the number of new Cuban immigrants each year, improve the method of
identifying refugees, redouble efforts to process Cubans seeking to leave Cuba, and
initiate a public information campaign in Florida and Cuba to better inform Cubans
of the routes to safe and legal migration to the United States.  The President’s
announcement was in part a response to the criticism of the Administration’s
migration policy in the aftermath of the July 2003 repatriation of the individuals
involved in stealing a Cuban government vessel. 
Migration Talks.  Semi-annual U.S.-Cuban talks alternating between Cuba
and the United States had been held regularly on the implementation of the 1994 and
1995 migration accords, but the State Department cancelled the 20th round of talks
scheduled for January 2004, and no migration talks have been held since.  According
to the State Department, Cuba has refused to discuss five issues identified by the
United States: (1) Cuba’s issuance of exit permits for all qualified migrants; (2)
Cuba’s cooperation in holding a new registration for an immigrant lottery; (3) the
need for a deeper Cuban port utilized by the U.S. Coast Guard for the repatriation of
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Cubans interdicted at sea; (4) Cuba’s responsibility to permit U.S. diplomats to travel
to monitor returned migrants; and (5) Cuba’s obligation to accept the return of Cuban
nationals determined to be excludable from the United States.69
In response to the cancellation of the talks, Cuban officials maintained that the
U.S. decision was irresponsible and that it was prepared to discuss all of the issues
raised by the United States.70 The last time talks were suspended was in 2000 by the
Cuban government when Elian Gonzalez was in the United States.
Legislation Approved in the 108th Congress
For a complete listing of legislative initiatives on Cuba in the 108th Congress,
see CRS Report RL31740, Cuba: Issues for the 108th Congress.
Appropriations Measures  
P.L. 108-447 (H.R. 4818), Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005.
Originally introduced as FY2005 Foreign Operations Appropriations, which the
House approved on July 13, 2004, and the Senate approved, amended, on September
23, 2004. Conference report, H.Rept. 108-792, filed November 20, 2004, which
incorporated nine regular appropriations bills. The House agreed (344-51) to the
conference report on November 20, 2004, as did the Senate (65-30). President signed
into law December 8, 2004.
Division A, covering Agriculture appropriations, dropped the Cuba provision
that had been included in the Senate committee version of S. 2803 (Section 776) that
would have eased restrictions on travel to Cuba if it was related to the commercial
sale of agricultural and medical products.
Division B, covering Commerce, Justice and State appropriations, dropped the
Cuba provision in the House-passed version of H.R. 4754 (Section 801) that would
have prohibited funds from being used to implement recent restrictions on gift
parcels and on baggage for travelers.  The omnibus measure also earmarked $27.629
million for broadcasting to Cuba, the full amount requested by the Administration.
Division D, covering Foreign Operations appropriations, dropped contrasting
House- and Senate-approved provisions from the original versions of H.R. 4818
related to assistance for cooperation with Cuba on counter-narcotics matters.  The
Senate version would have provided $5 million in International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement assistance for such efforts, while the House version would
have prohibited such assistance. The omnibus measure also earmarked $9 million in
Economic Support Funds, as requested by the Administration, for Cuba projects to
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promote democratization, respect for human rights, and the development of a free
market economy.
Division H, covering Transportation/Treasury appropriations, dropped all House
and Senate provisions that would have eased Cuba sanctions.  These consisted of
three House provisions in H.R. 5025 that would have eased Cuba sanctions on family
and educational travel and on private commercial sales of agricultural and medical
products; and one Senate provision in the committee version S. 2806 that would have
prohibited funds from administering or enforcing restrictions on Cuba travel.  
P.L. 108-199 (H.R. 2673),  Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2004.
Originally introduced as the FY2004 agriculture appropriations measure, which the
House passed July 14, 2003, and the Senate passed November 6, 2003.  On
November 25, 2003, a conference report was filed, H.Rept. 108-401, which
incorporated seven regular appropriations acts for the year.  Conference report agreed
to (242-176) in House November 25, 2003; agreed to (65-28) in Senate January 22,
2004.  Signed into law January 23, 2004.
Division A, covering Agriculture appropriations, dropped the Cuba provision
that had been included in the Senate-approved version of H.R. 2673 (Section 760)
that would have allowed travel to Cuba under a general license (without applying to
the Treasury Department) for travel related to commercial sales of agricultural and
medical goods.  
Division B, covering Commerce, Justice, and State appropriations, funds Radio
and TV broadcasting to Cuba under the International Broadcasting Operations
Account, but without a specific earmark. The conferees stated that they expected the
Broadcasting Board of Governors to provide $1.2 million to pursue alternative means
of transmission, including Internet transmission, of Cuba broadcasting. The
Administration requested $26.901 million for Cuba broadcasting, with $16.355
million for Radio Marti and $10.546 million for TV Marti. 
Division D, covering Foreign Operations appropriations, did not include
assistance for counter-narcotics cooperation with Cuba that had been in the Senate-
approved version of H.R. 2800 (Section 680), nor did it include the provision in the
House version of bill (Section 571) that would have prohibited such assistance.
Division D also funded democracy programs for Cuba. While the conferees did not
earmark assistance for Cuba democracy programs in the bill, the conference report
recommended full funding of the Administration’s $7 million in Economic Support
Funds for democracy programs supported by USAID. The House-passed version of
H.R. 2800 had no earmark (although the House report, H.Rept. 108-122,
recommended full funding of the Administration’s $7 million request), while the
Senate-passed version of H.R. 2800 (Section 699G) would have provided not more
than $5 billion in Transition Initiatives funds for democracy-building efforts for
Cuba.  
Division F, covering Transportation/Treasury appropriations, dropped all
provisions easing Cuba sanctions that had been included in the House- and Senate-
approved versions of H.R. 2989.  Both the House and Senate versions of H.R. 2989
had a nearly identical provision (Section 745 in the House version and Section 643
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in the Senate verison) that would have prevented funds from being used to administer
or enforce restrictions on travel or travel-related transactions. In addition, the House
version of H.R. 2989 had provisions that would have prevented funds from being
used to administer or enforce restrictions on remittances (Section 746) and from
being used to eliminate the travel category of people-to-people educational exchanges
(Section 749). 
P.L. 108-7 (H.J.Res. 2), Consolidated Appropriations Resolution for
FY2003.  President signed into law February 20, 2003. While the measure did not
earmark funding for human rights and democracy projects for Cuba, it funded
FY2003 Foreign Operations appropriations; the Administration’s FY2003 foreign aid
request had included $6 million for such projects ($5.750 was ultimately allocated
by the Administration).  The omnibus bill also provided $24.996 million for Radio
and TV Marti broadcasting to Cuba. 
Human Rights Resolutions
H.Res. 179 (Diaz-Balart, Lincoln).  Expresses the sense of the House regarding
the systematic human rights violations in Cuba committed by the Castro regime, calls
for the immediate release of all political prisoners, and supports respect for basic
human rights and free elections in Cuba.  Introduced April 7, 2003.  House passed
(414-0, 11 present) April 8, 2003.
S.Res. 62 (Ensign).  Calling upon the OAS Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, the European
Union, and human rights activists throughout the world to take certain actions in
regard to the human rights situation in Cuba. Introduced February 24, 2003; referred
to Committee on Foreign Relations. Senate agreed to by unanimous consent on June
27, 2003. 
S.Res. 97 (Nelson, Bill).  Expresses the sense of the Senate regarding the arrests
of Cuban democracy activists by the Cuban government.  Introduced March 25,
2003; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discharged by unanimous consent.
Senate amended and agreed to the resolution April 7, 2003, by unanimous consent.
S.Res. 328 (Nelson, Bill).  Expresses the sense of the Senate regarding the
continued human rights violations committed by Fidel Castro and the Cuban
government, calls on Cuba to immediately release individuals imprisoned for
political purposes, and calls upon the 60th session of the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights to condemn Cuba for its human rights abuses and demand that inspectors from
the International Committee of the Red Cross be allowed to visit and inspect Cuban
prisons. Introduced April 1, 2004; Senate passed, amended, April 8, 2004, by
unanimous consent.
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Legislative Initiatives in the 109th Congress
Human Rights
H.Con.Res. 81 (Menendez). Expresses the sense of Congress regarding the
two-year anniversary of the human rights crackdown in Cuba.  Introduced March 2,
2005; approved by the House Committee on International Relations March 9, 2005.
House passed (398-27, 2 present) April 27, 2005.
H.Res. 193 (Diaz-Balart, Mario). Expresses support of the House of
Representatives to the organizers and participants of the May 20, 2005, meeting in
Havana of the Assembly to Promote Civil Society. Introduced April 6, 2005;
approved by the Committee on International Relations April 27, 2005.  House passed
(392-22, 1 present) May 10, 2005.
S.Res. 140 (Martinez). Expresses support of the Senate for the May 20, 2005
meeting in Havana of the Assembly to Promote Civil Society. Introduced May 12,
2005; Senate approved by unanimous consent May 17, 2005.
S. 600 (Lugar).  Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and
2007.  Introduced and reported by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Mar. 10,
2005 (S.Rept. 109-35). S.Amdt. 319 (Ensign) offered on April 6, 2005, would
authorize not more than $15 million in assistance and other support “for individuals
and independent nongovernmental organizations to support democracy-building
efforts for Cuba” and up to $5 million for the OAS to support work on Cuba’s human
rights situation. Also see amendments below Cuba sanctions (S.Amdt. 281) and on
television broadcasting to Cuba (S.Amdt. 284). 
Modification of Sanctions
H.R. 208 (Serrano).  Cuba Reconciliation Act.  Lifts the trade embargo.
Removes provisions restricting trade and other relations with Cuba, including repeal
of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Act of 1996, and provisions of Section 211 of the Department of Commerce and
Relations Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 related to transactions or payments
with respect to trademarks.  Introduced Jan.  4, 2005; referred to the Committees on
International Relations, Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Judiciary,
Financial Services, Government Reform, and Agriculture. 
H.R. 332 (King).  Amends the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act
of 1996 to require that, in order to determine that a democratically elected
government in Cuba exists, the government extradite to the United States convicted
felon William Morales and all other individuals who are living in Cuba in order to
escape prosecution or confinement for criminal offense committed in the United
States.  Introduced Jan. 25, 2005; referred to the Committee on International
Relations.
H.R. 579 (Paul).  Lifts the trade embargo.  Removes provisions restricting trade
and other relations with Cuba, including repeal of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992,
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the Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act of 1996, and provisions of Section 211 of the
Department of Commerce and Relations Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 related
to transactions or payments with respect to trademarks.  Prohibits U.S. assistance to
Cuba.  Introduced Feb. 2, 2005; referred to Committees on International Relations,
Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Judiciary, Financial Services, Government
Reform, and Agriculture. 
H.R. 719 (Moran of Kansas)/S. 328 (Craig).   Agricultural Export Facilitation
Act of 2005.  Identical bills to facilitate the sale of U.S. agricultural products to
Cuba, as authorized by the Trade Sanctions and Export Enhancement Act of 2000.
The bills would provide for a general license by the Secretary of the Treasury for
travel-related transactions related to the sales and marketing of agricultural products
to Cuba; express the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should issue visas
for the temporary entry of Cuban nationals to conduct activities related to purchasing
U.S. agricultural goods; clarify the “payment of cash in advance” term used in the
Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) to mean that
the payment by the purchaser and the receipt of such payment to the seller occurs
prior to the transfer of title of the commodity or product to the purchaser and the
release of control of such commodity or product to the purchaser; would prohibit the
President from restricting direct transfers from a Cuban financial institution to a U.S.
financial institution for U.S. agricultural sales under TSRA; and repeals Section 211
of the Department of Commerce and Relations Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999
related to transactions or payments with respect to trademarks.  
H.R. 719 introduced  Feb.  9, 2005; referred to the Committees on International
Relations, Judiciary, Financial Services, and Agriculture.  S. 328 introduced Feb.  9,
2005; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations.  S.Amdt. 140 (Martinez), an
amendment intended to be proposed to S. 328, would require a presidential
certification to Congress that Cuba has released or properly accounted for political
prisoners in Cuba, including a list of 79 individuals, before the provisions of the act
take effect.
H.R. 1268 (Lewis). FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for
Defense, the Global War on Terror and Tsunami Relief.  Introduced Mar. 11, 2005.
During Apr. 20, 2005, Senate floor debate, S.Amdt. 475 (Craig), as modified by
S.Amdt. 549 (Baucus) and S.Amdt. 552 (Baucus), would have clarified the terms of
“payment of cash in advance” under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act of 2000.  The amendment was ruled non-germane. 
H.R. 1339 (Emerson)/S. 634 (Chambliss).  Similar, although not identical,
bills, to amend the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000
to clarify allowable payment terms for sales of agricultural commodities and products
to Cuba.  The bills would clarify that “payment of cash in advance” means the
payment by the purchaser and the receipt of such payment to the seller occurs prior
to the transfer of title of such commodity or product to the purchaser and the release
of control of such commodity or product to the purchaser.  H.R. 1339 introduced
Mar. 16, 2005; referred to Committees on Financial Services, International Relations,
and Agriculture.  S. 634 introduced Mar.  16, 2005; referred to Committee on Foreign
Relations.  
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S. 600 (Lugar).  Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and
2007.  Introduced and reported by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Mar.  10,
2005 (S.Rept. 109-35).  During Senate floor consideration on Apr. 6, 2005, the
Senate considered S.Amdt. 281 (Baucus) and a second-degree amendment, S.Amdt.
282 (Craig) that would facilitate the sale of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba.  The
language of the amendments consists of the provisions of S. 328 (Craig), the
Agricultural Export Facilitation Act of 2005 described above.  Also see amendment
above on assistance for Cuba human rights and democracy projects (S. 319), and
below on television broadcasting to Cuba (S.Amdt. 284). 
S. 691 (Domenici)/H.R. 1689 (Feeney). Modifies the prohibition (so-called
Section 211) on recognition by U.S. courts of certain rights relating to certain marks,
trade names, or commercial names.  S. 691 introduced April 4, 2005; referred to
Senate Committee on the Judiciary.  HR. 1689 introduced April 19, 2005; referred
to House Committee on the Judiciary.
S. 894 (Enzi)/H.R. 1814 (Flake). Similar, although not identical, bills to allow
travel between the United States and Cuba.  S. 894 introduced Apr. 25, 2005; referred
to the Committee on Foreign Relations. H.R. 1814 introduced Apr. 26, 2005; referred
to the Committee on International Relations.
Migration
H.R. 209 (Serrano).  Baseball Diplomacy Act.  Waives certain prohibitions
with respect to nationals of Cuba coming to the United States to play organized
baseball.  Introduced Jan. 4, 2005; referred to Committees on International Relations
and Judiciary.
Cuba Broadcasting
S. 600 (Lugar).  Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and
2007.  Introduced and reported by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Mar.  10,
2005 (S.Rept. 109-35).  Section 111 authorizes appropriations for radio and
television broadcasting to Cuba under the International Broadcasting Operations
account.  Section 503 amends the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act to authorize the
Office of Cuba Broadcasting to use additional AM frequencies as well as FM and
shortwave frequencies in order to improve signal delivery to Cuba.  During Senate
floor consideration on April 6, 2005, the Senate tabled S.Amdt. 284 (Dorgan), by a
vote of 65-35, that would have prohibited funds from being used for television
broadcasting to Cuba.  Also see amendments above on assistance for Cuba human
rights and democracy projects (S. 319) and on Cuba sanctions (S.Amdt. 281).
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